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Abstract 
Two experiments examined the relationships between the knowledge that another 
person has won in a gamble, the illusion of control and risk taking. Participants played a 
computer-simulated French roulette game individually. Before playing, some 
participants learnt that another person won a large amount of money. Results from a first 
experiment (n=24) validated a causal model where the knowledge of another person’s 
win increased the illusion of control, measured with betting times, expectancy and self-
reports on scales, which in turn encourages risk taking. In the second experiment 
(n=36), some participants were told the previous player acknowledged the win to be 
fortuitous. The suppression of the belief that the previous winner had himself exerted 
control over the outcome resulted in lower rates of risk-taking behaviors. This suggests 
that it was not the knowledge of another person’s win in itself that increased risk taking, 
but rather, the belief that the other person had some control over the gamble’s outcome. 
Theoretical implications for the study of social mechanisms involved in gambling 
behavior are discussed. 
Keywords: gambling, illusion of control, risk taking, social reference 
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Reports of Wins and Risk Taking: 
An Investigation of the Mediating Effect of the Illusion of Control 
 
Imagine that two gamblers, Alice and Kelly, are playing on video lottery machines. 
Alice is playing on her own in a public house whereas Kelly is in a busy casino. Both 
have just lost their last Euro. Kelly then witnesses another gambler win with the usual 
eye-catching sight and sound display. Who will be more likely to gamble again, Alice 
or Kelly? To answer this question from a traditional perspective on gambling behavior, 
one would seek to ascertain who among the two protagonists has the longest history of 
gambling, what social norms govern public house gambling behavior, or what are their 
individual differences (e.g., family history, intelligence, extraversion, substance abuse, 
etc.). In the present study, however, we address this issue from the perspective of social 
cognition. As suggested by Rockloff and Dyer (2007), co-actors or an audience may 
facilitate performance for a variety of behaviors. Building upon this observation, this 
study aims to gain a better understanding of the effect of knowing that someone else has 
won on one’s own gambling behavior. 
Stories about gambling wins are widely publicized by the media yet losses are 
much more frequent than wins (Hill & Williamson, 1998; McMullan & Mullen, 2001). 
These practices may have important consequences on gambling behavior. For instance, 
knowing that someone else has won has been shown to increase individuals’ risk taking 
(Kearnay & Drabman, 1992; Le Floch, Martinez,& Gaffié, 2004). However, little is 
known about the mechanisms that underpin the effect of reports of wins on gambling 
behavior. There is evidence showing that the perception of other gamblers’ 
characteristics can influence an individual’s illusion of control (Dykstra & Dollinger, 
1990; Langer, 1975) and this illusion has been suggested to be a key factor in increasing 
risk taking (e.g., Walker, 1992). This suggests a causal model within which the illusion 
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of control could be a mediator of the effect of the knowledge of another person’s win on 
one’s risk-taking behavior (see Figure 1). In the next section, we critically review 
evidence from the literature supporting this model. We then present two experiments 
that provide a direct empirical test of this model. In the first experiment, we sought to 
discover if reports of wins increased beliefs in the winner’s ability to control the 
outcome of the gamble. In the second experiment we sought to test whether the 
suppression of the belief that the previous winner had exerted control over the gamble’s 
outcome could cancel the effect of reports of wins on risk taking. 
Linking Reports of Wins, Risk taking and the Illusion of Control 
Why and how reports of wins increase gambling behaviors and risk taking?  
Studies anchored in social learning theory (Bandura, 1977) have shown that peer 
modeling frequently induced risk-taking behavior in children and adolescents (Browne 
& Brown, 1994, Hardoon & Derevensky, 2001). For example, preschool children were 
shown to be more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior in a game of pure chance 
after seeing a peer having just ostensibly won this game (Kearney & Drabman, 
1992).With  adults, witnessing the win seems unnecessary to increase risk taking. 
Mushquash (2004) indeed reported that about half of 182 respondents from the general 
public felt the urge to gamble after learning that someone else had won. A recent study 
(Rockloff & Dyer, 2007) investigated the existence of a social facilitation effect 
(Zajonc, 1965) for gambling behavior on electronic gaming machines. Some 
participants received false feedback from the computer designed to suggest that other 
gamers in adjacent rooms were playing and sometimes winning at the same game. This 
experiment demonstrated that the implied presence and wins of other gamblers 
intensified gambling, measured by greater persistence and lower final payouts. 
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Martinez, Le Floch, and Gaffié (2005) directly tested whether reporting another 
person’s win would affect subsequent gambling behavior under laboratory conditions. 
This study did not test the effects of the presence of co-actors on gambling behavior in 
real time. However, it suggested that information about the performance of others is 
likely to intensify gambling behavior as measured by risk taking. In this study, 
participants individually played a computer-simulated “French roulette game”1 and 
were falsely told that a previous participant had a large or a small win during their play. 
Results indicated that the knowledge alone of another person’s large win was enough to 
increase risk taking. In the following section, we begin by reviewing evidence 
suggesting that reports of others’ wins may indeed lead to an increase in illusion of 
control. 
Why and how reports of wins lead to an increase in illusion of control? 
Langer (1975) defined the illusion of control as the “expectancy of a personal success 
probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant.” (p. 
313). According to Langer, the more skill-related factors (choice, stimulus familiarity, 
active involvement, and competition) are present in a game of chance, the more an 
illusion of control is likely to occur. In her first study, Langer (1975) examined the 
effect of competition in a game of pure chance where the player selecting the highest 
card would win the betting round. She demonstrated that participants bet significantly 
more money when playing against an incompetent competitor than when playing 
against a competent one. Langer interpreted these results as showing that, in direct 
competition, participants disregard the uncontrollable and random nature of chance. 
Instead they misconceive the game of pure chance as a skilled task where their 
                                                 
1
 There are several variants of the «roulette» game; the French roulette is the most popular version in 
European casinos in general, and in French casinos, in particular. 
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probability of winning depend on their level of competence relative to that of other 
players and where they can apply strategies to increase their wins. 
Direct competition, however, is not necessary to generate such an illusion of 
control. Dykstra and Dollinger (1990) did not use a directly competitive task: they 
merely showed to their participants a video of another player that was either presented 
as a competent gambler or as an incompetent one. Results showed that participants who 
had watched an incompetent-looking model gave higher estimates of their own success 
at the game. These results suggest that participants evaluate how well they could 
perform in the chance task based on their perception of the other gambler’s competence 
as if it were a skilled task. 
Martinez et al. (2005) reported that the knowledge of another person’s win 
significantly increased the time taken by participants to select bets. General decisions 
result from a compromise between the desire to make a correct choice and the desire to 
minimize effort (Lipman, 1991; see also Payne, Bettman &Johnson, 1993). 
Additionally, the amount of effort spent on a task is regulated as a function of the 
expected effects of the actions undertaken (Bandura, 1986). Thus, one may expect that 
individuals will only “invest” in making the effort of thinking when they perceive the 
task to be controllable. In fact research has already established that individuals who 
believe they have little control over subsequent outcomes do not persevere as much as 
those who believe they can exert control over these outcomes (Testa & Major, 1990). 
Thus the longer time taken to place bets under the knowledge of another gambler’s win 
in Martinez et al.’s (2005) study could be interpreted as additional, albeit indirect, 
evidence for the hypothesis that knowledge of another gambler’s win entails an increase 
in illusion of control. 
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On the basis of these results, we expect that knowing how much another gambler 
has won will be interpreted as a skill-related cue. Specifically, reports of wins should 
increase the belief that gambling is a skilled task and thereby induce an illusion of 
control, which in turn would lead to an unrealistic anticipation of personal success. To 
validate our proposed causal model (see Figure 1), the link between illusion of control 
and risk taking should also be established. We review evidence for such a link in the 
following section. 
Do we take more risks when we believe we can control the outcome of a 
situation?  
The illusion of control has often been suggested to be a key factor in increasing 
risk taking (Dixon, 2000; Griffiths, 1994; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Langer, 1975; 
Walker, 1992). Although illusory control does appear to encourage risk-taking in other 
domains (Horswill & McKenna, 1999), the link between taking risks and overlooking 
the uncontrollable and random nature of chance has not been firmly established in 
gambling games. Delfabbro and Winefield (2000) found that players who staked more 
money also verbalized more thoughts, which in turn would suggest they erroneously 
assessed their ability to control the game. However, the authors themselves 
acknowledged that participants’ spontaneous verbalizations may represent a post facto 
justification for their risk-taking behavior rather than a causal determinant of such 
behavior.  Similarly, Caron and Ladouceur (2003) showed that participants exposed to 
an accomplice’s deceptive verbalizations (e.g., “now, I played really badly!”) took more 
risks than participants who heard adequate verbalizations (e.g., “it’s too bad that we 
don’t control chance!”) or no verbalization at all. The authors, however, did not 
measure the effect of the accomplice’s verbalizations on participants’ own beliefs.  
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Therefore, a direct causal link between erroneous beliefs on controllability and risk-
taking behaviors remains to be empirically established. 
The Present Study 
The present study aimed to test a causal model where the illusion of control is a 
mediator of the effect of reports of others’ wins on one’s risk-taking behavior (see 
Figure 1). In order to test this model, we first manipulated whether or not gamblers 
knew about another person’s win and assessed the effect of this manipulation on 
gamblers’ illusion of control and risk-taking behavior. In addition, to test for the 
hypothesis that the illusion of control was a mediator of the causal relation between 
knowledge of another’s win and risk taking, we also directly assessed whether the 
degree of illusory control affected risk taking. 
Thus, building on Martinez et al.’s (2005) findings, we expected that knowing 
how much a previous player had won in a gamble would increase risk taking. 
Specifically, we anticipated that the knowledge of another person’s win would 
strengthen the belief that Roulette is a game of skill, which requires strategic, effortful 
thinking. Consequently, knowledge of another person’s win was expected to result in 
increased gains expectancy and increased betting times. Finally, we hypothesized that 
an increase in the illusion of control would also lead to an increase in risk taking. We 
report two experiments. The first experiment examined whether the illusion of control is 
a mediator of the effect of knowing another gambler’s win on risk-taking. The second 
experiment examined whether discrediting the belief that the other gambler may have 
won by exerting control over the gamble’s outcome is sufficient to eliminate the effect 
of knowing about this gambler’s wins. 




An opportunity sample of 24 female students was selected in the Psychology 
building of the University of Toulouse. Ages ranged from 18 to 27 years. None of the 
participants in either this or the following experiment had any history of gambling, nor 
were they familiar with French roulette. 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups (equal number per 
cell).In the experimental group, participants were informed of the amount won by the 
previous gambler. In the control group, this information was omitted. Each participant 
took part in 15 game trials2.  
The illusion of control, the hypothesized mediating psychological construct (see 
Figure 1), was measured with three dependent variables. From a statistical point of 
view, mediators are defined as variables that “transmit the effect of one variable to 
another variable” (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007, p. 594) whereby a cause only 
indirectly affect an outcome through a mediator. The construct validity of the variable 
conceptualized as the statistical mediator is an important concern in testing mediation. 
To remove the biasing effect of measurement error, Baron and Kenny (1986) advised 
that multiple independent and converging measurements should be collected to tap a 
latent variable. Therefore, we used two classical subjective measurements of illusion of 
control (Langer, 1975): the belief that gambling is a skilled task (assessed with self-
report scales) and their gain expectancy (measured as the expected number of chips at 
the end of the gambling session). Additionally, akin to Martinez et al. (2005), we 
                                                 
2
 Note that although the number of participants per cell was relatively small, each of these participants 
participated in fifteen trials (see procedure) thereby increasing the power to detect treatment effects. 
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measured the time taken to place bets as a potential additional measurement of illusion 
of control.  
 Finally, risk taking, the outcome variable, was measured using the RT index 
(Martinez et al., 2005; see Appendix 2) adapted from Ladouceur and Mayrand (1986) 
which takes into account the number of chips placed on a bet as well as the probability 
of losing one’s stakes, and the current resources of the gambler at the time of betting.  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were invited to play a computer-simulated French roulette game 
individually for 45 minutes. In fact, the experiment stopped at the 15th round and lasted 
around 25 minutes. This was to ensure that participants would not suspect that the 
experiment was to stop when it did and as a result would not be tempted to place all 
their chips on the last bet. The experimenter explained the rules of the French roulette to 
the participants (See Appendix 1). 
The different types of bets possible, their placement on the layout table 
(reproduced in Figure 2), the probability of a win and their potential payouts 
(summarized in Table 1) were then presented to the participants. A booklet 
summarizing this information was available throughout the course of the experiment. 
Following this presentation, the experimenter explained the functioning of the software. 
Participants were given a credit of a 100 chips. At any point in the game, they were able 
to see the number of chips they had left on the computer screen. They were warned that 
the program would stop automatically if they lost all their chips. For each game trial, the 
software recorded the number chips placed on any given bet, the probability of losing 
this bet, and the current resources of the gambler at the time of placing the bet(s). These 
measures were later used to calculate the risk taking index.  
Reports of Wins and Risk Taking 10 
In addition, participants in the experimental condition were given the following 
information before the start of the game (translated from the French): 
 “At the end of the game, I will write down the number of chips you have left on 
the sheet under the keyboard. As you can see on this sheet, Dominique Fabre3who 
played before you has won 750 chips.” To avoid raising the suspicions of participants, 
the experimenter then drew their attention to the disorderly state of the room and said: 
"Why is there a sheet of paper under the keyboard? I’ll remove it later”. The reminder 
of another person’s win thus remained visible throughout the duration of the 
experiment. In the control group, the experimenter indicated a blank sheet and simply 
said: “At the end of the game, I will write down the number of chips you have left on 
the sheet under the keyboard.” 
Participants completed their familiarization with the task with five practice trials4. 
Before the game session began, participants were asked to report how many chips they 
expected to have at the end of the game (expectancy measure) as well as to rate their 
agreement with two statements (“There are strategies that increase the probability of 
winning”; “The more I think about strategies to place my bets, the more I increase my 
probability of success”) on a 7-point scale from “totally disagree” to “totally agree” 
(subjective illusion of control measure). In addition, the time they took to place a bet 
was recorded on each betting trial. 
                                                 
3
 This name was selected because it is gender neutral in French. 
4
 Since participants were not familiar with the Roulette game, the experimenter enquired several times 
about the participants’ understanding of the rules of this game and offered to re-explain the rules. All 
participants confirmed they had understood the rules. This was also confirmed by their gambling 
behaviours which were also suggestive of a good understanding of the game rules. 
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Results and Discussion 
Does knowing about another gambler’s win affects risk taking and illusion of 
control? 
Participants’ risk taking (RT) on each given trial was calculated by taking into 
account the number of chips placed on any given bet, the objective probability of 
winning with such a bet as well as the total number of chips owned by the gambler at 
the time of placing the bet(s) (see Appendix 2 for the exact formula). The resulting 
score was greater than 0 and less than 1 where a higher score was indicative of greater 
risk taking. Those RT scores were averaged across the fifteen trials to provide one risk-
taking index per participant. Overall, participants’ RT index was higher when they 
knew the previous gambler had won 750 chips; M = .12 (SD = .08) vs. M = .03 (SD = 
.01) in the control group. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed this 
difference was statistically significant; F (1, 22) = 13.62, p < .001 partial η² = .38. 
Ratings for the two statements about personal control were significantly and 
highly correlated; r(24) = .84, p <.001; and were averaged to form an index of 
subjective personal control. Participants’ index of personal control was again higher 
when they knew the previous gambler had won 750 chips; M = 5.92 (SD = .79) vs. M = 
3.17 (SD = 1.47) in the control group. This difference was reliable; F (1, 22) = 32.64, p 
< .001, partialη² = .59. Finally, learning about someone else’s win also resulted in 
greater gain expectancies; M = 235 (SD = 134.06) vs. M = 61.75 (SD = 57.96) in the 
control group; and longer times to place a bet; M = 31.62s (SD = 7.19) vs. M = 19.67s 
(SD = 5.89) in the control group. Once again, both these differences were statistically 
reliable; F (1, 22) = 16.89, p < .001 partial η² = .43 and F(1, 22) = 19.83, p < .001, 
partialη² = .47 respectively. 
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Does illusion of control mediates the effect of knowing about another gambler’s 
win on risk taking? 
Although the results presented above are consistent with our hypotheses, they do 
not, in themselves, attest to the mediating effect of the illusion of control. To test for our 
causal model, we followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) regression-based procedure to 
test for mediation effects. In line with Martinez et al.’s (2005) findings, the longer the 
betting times the greater the score on self-report measures of the illusion of control, r 
(24) = .72, p <.001, and the greater the number of chips the participants expected to 
retain at the end of the game; r (24) = .70, p <.001. We therefore standardized these 
three variables and computed an average score, which provided an estimate of the latent 
illusion of control construct for each participant.  
Regression analyses showed that knowledge of another person’s win was a 
significant predictor of risk-taking index, β = .62, t(24) = 3.69, p < .01, and a significant 
predictor of illusion of control, β = .82, t(24) = 6.74, p < .001. However, when the risk-
taking index was regressed on both knowledge of another person’s win and illusion of 
control, the effect of knowledge of another’s win became non-significant, β = .15, t(24) 
= .54, p = .59, while the illusion of control remained a significant predictor of risk-
taking, β = .57, t(24) = 2.11, p < .05 (adjusted R2 = .44 for the full model). A Sobel test 
confirmed that the effect of this mediation was significant (z = 1.98, p < .05). 
Altogether, these results, summarized in Figure 3, establish what Baron and Kenny refer 
to as a “perfect mediation”. 
The purpose of this first experiment was to test a causal model of risk-taking 
behavior in gambling. The present results confirmed that the effect on risk taking of 
knowing about previous players’ wins was mediated by players’ increased illusion of 
control. As such, these results suggest that, in the absence of any other information, the 
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previous gambler’s win was misinterpreted as a sign that this previous player was 
skilful, rather than merely lucky. Previous research has established that the perceived 
level of competence of other gamblers may affect one’s own illusion of control (e.g., 
Dykstra & Dollinger, 1990). It is thus plausible to assume that the misattribution of the 
previous gambler’s win to their skill amplified participants’ illusion of control, which, 
in turn, resulted in an increase in risk taking. Experiment 2 was designed to provide an 
empirical test for this explanation. 
Experiment 2 
The second experiment aimed to further examine what motivated participants’ 
increase in illusory control upon learning the (successful) outcome of a previous player. 
We hypothesized that this resulted from the misattribution of the previous’ player 
outcome to their skilfulness. If this explanation is correct, the extent of gamblers’ 
illusion of control and as well as the extent to which they place risky bets should be 
positively correlated with the degree of personal control they attribute to the previous 
gambler. Furthermore, players should no longer be influenced by the knowledge of the 
previous gambler’s win if they are made aware that this win was fortuitous. Such 
information should prevent the misinterpretation of the previous gambler’s win as 
evidence of their skillfulness. Thus, we anticipated that knowing that a previous player 
had fortuitously won should have no effect on participants’ perceived personal control 
and hence, no longer affect their risk taking. We tested these predictions in Experiment 
2. 
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Method 
Participants  
An opportunity sample of 36 female students was selected in the Psychology 
building of the University of Toulouse. Ages ranged from 19 to 26 years. None of these 
students had been participants in Experiment 1. 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. The first 
experimental condition (hereafter the “win” condition) and the control condition were 
identical to the conditions used in Experiment 1. In a second experimental condition, 
(hereafter the “fortuitous win” condition), participants also learnt that a previous 
gambler had won a large amount; however, they were also informed that this win had 
been acknowledged as fortuitous. The dependent measures were identical to those used 
in Experiment 1. In addition, at the end of the experiment, all participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which the previous gambler controlled the situation on a scale ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 20 (completely). 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
Participants in the “win” and in the “fortuitous win” condition learnt that the previous 
player had won 750 chips. In the fortuitous win condition, however, the experimenter 
added: “but she told me that she did not control the situation. She played randomly and 
unexpectedly won 750 chips”. 
Results and Discussion 
 
As expected, gamblers’ illusion of control and risk taking was related to the 
degree of control they attributed to the previous winner. A significant positive 
correlation was observed between the degree of control attributed to the previous 
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winner and participants’ subjective estimates of personal control, r(24) = .72, p <.001, 
their gain expectancy, r(24) = .46 p < .05, and their betting times, r(24) = .43, p < .05. 
Attributed control also was also strongly correlated with participants’ own risk taking 
index, r(24) = .59, p < .001. 
As predicted, risk-taking indices were affected by the way in which the wins of 
the previous player were specified; F (2, 33) = 10.5, p < .001, η² = .39. Participants who 
were simply told that the previous player had won 750 chips took higher risks when 
betting compared to those had no information, M = .09 (SD = .04) vs. M = .03 (SD = 
.03). Planned comparisons revealed that this difference was reliable, thus replicating our 
findings from Experiment 1, Dunnett’s F(1, 22) = 13.62, p <.01. By contrast, 
participants who were told that the previous gambler’s win was fortuitous exhibited 
similar levels of risk taking than those in the control condition, M = .03 (SD = .03) vs. 
M = .03 (SD = .03), Dunnett’s F(1, 22) = .01, p = .63. 
A similar pattern of results was observed for the measures of illusory control. All 
measures were affected by the type of report of wins, F(2, 33) = 5.7, p< .0, η² = .26,  
F(2, 33) = 4.64, p < .05, η² = .22, and F(2, 33) = 11.66, p < .001, η² = .41 for the 
subjective estimates of personal control, expectancy, and betting times, respectively. 
Planned contrasts revealed that being told that the previous gambler won 750 chips 
increased participants’ perceived personal control, M = 5.33 (SD = 1.45) vs. M = 3.63 
(SD = 1.33) in the control condition, Dunnett’s F(1, 22) = 9.02, p <.01. It also 
significantly increased expectancy, M = 195.67 (SD = 191.61) vs. M = 65.92 (SD = 
47.74) in the control condition, Dunnett’s F(1, 22) = 5.18, p <.05. Finally, it also 
significantly increased betting times, M = 41.91 (SD = 8.46) vs. M = 19.8 (SD = 5.9), 
Dunnett’s F (1, 22) = 12.92, p < .01. These results therefore replicated Experiment 1’s 
findings.  
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In keeping with our current predictions, however, participants in the “fortuitous 
win” condition behaved no differently from those in the control group. They exhibited 
the same level of personal control: M = 3.83 (SD = 1.27) vs. M = 3.63 (SD = 1.33), 
Dunnett’s F(1, 22) = .16, p = .91; provided similar expectancy estimates, M = 74.58 (SD 
= 42.39) vs. M = 65.92 (SD = 47.74, Dunnett’s F(1, 22) = .22, p = .98 and took similar 
amounts of time to place their bets, M = 20.75 (SD = 5.34) vs. M = 19.8 (SD = 5.9), 
Dunnett’s F(1, 22) = .17, p = .59. 
Finally, we sought to replicate the analysis for mediation effect of illusion of 
control when participants were simply told another player had won 750 chips compared 
to the control group. Results showed all criteria for mediation were satisfied. 
Specifically, knowledge of the previous player’s win was a significant predictor of risk-
taking, β = .62, t(24) = 3.68, p < .01, and a significant predictor of the illusion of 
control, β = .6, t(24) = 3.51, p < .01. When, however, the risk-taking index was 
regressed on both knowledge and illusion of control, the latter remained a significant 
predictor, β = .63, t(24) = 3.82, p < .01 while the effect of the knowledge of another 
person’s win on the same index was no longer a significant predictor, β = .24, t(24) = 
1.47, p = .16, (adjusted R2 = .61 for the full model). These analyses thus replicated the 
“perfect mediation” (Baron & Kenny, 1986) observed in Experiment 1, Sobel test z = 
2.53, p < .05. Figure 4 summarizes these results. 
To summarize, this second experiment demonstrated that the increase in risk 
taking subsequent to the report of a previous player’s win was contingent on the belief 
that this player had exerted control over the outcome of his game session. The degree of 
control assigned to another person was strongly and positively correlated with 
participants’ own illusion of control and risk taking. When participants believed that the 
previous winner had no control over the outcome of his gamble, learning the amount he 
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had won no longer affected participants’ illusory control or risk taking. When, however, 
participants were simply told about the amount won by the previous player, such 
knowledge significantly increased their risk taking, and their level of illusion of control 
was a significant mediator of this relationship, thereby replicating the results obtained in 
Experiment 1. 
General discussion 
The literature on the psychology of gambling suggests that gambling behavior can 
be facilitated by several determining factors, such as the physiological arousal that 
occurs when an individual is in a casino (Anderson & Brown, 1984; Dickerson, Hinchy, 
England, Fabre & Cunningham, 1992), the presence of other gamblers who recognize 
gambling as socially acceptable (Wood & Griffiths, 1998), the imitation of other 
gamblers (Gupta& Derevensky1997; Hardoon & Derevensky, 2001), or the 
transmission of erroneous verbal information about the concept of chance (Caron & 
Ladouceur, 2003). All these accounts suggest that Kelly, the fictitious character 
introduced earlier, would be more likely to gamble again because she is playing in a 
casino, among other gamblers, rather than on her own in a public house. Kelly would 
also witness other players gambling and, sometimes, winning. 
Our objective in this article was to test an alternative explanatory model of the 
urge to gamble where knowing that another gambler has won increases illusion of 
control, which in turn encourages risk taking. Martinez et al. (2005) found that betting 
times was a significant mediator of the effect of reports of wins on risk taking. 
Increased betting times under the knowledge of another player’s outcome, however, 
could have been a reflection of many other concerns such as distractibility or peer-
pressure. The present study used multiple independent and converging measures of the 
mediator to improve the illusory control construct validity. As such it extended 
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Martinez et al. (2005) work by using a sounder methodology to assess the mediating 
effect of illusory control. 
Moreover, this study provided the first demonstration that when the win of the 
previous gambler was reported to be fortuitous, it not longer affected players’ own 
illusion of control or risk-taking behaviors (Experiment 2). This finding confirms that it 
is not the knowledge of another person’s win in itself that increases one’s risk taking, 
but rather the belief that this win came about because the other player was able to exert 
control over the outcome of the gamble. Together, these findings clearly reveal how 
social influences such as reports of another player’s win may affect gambling behavior. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Participants in this study knew they would not lose any real money, possibly 
limiting the generalizability of our findings. Although Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck 
and Perner (2002) found that “hypothetical” decisions (without real payoffs) appeared 
to match “real” decisions in laboratory tasks. They also added that this may not hold 
true for decisions where emotions and motivated needs play an important role, as it 
would be difficult to elicit these emotional states with hypothetical decisions. Given that 
real gambling decisions give rise to higher emotions than artificial ones (Anderson & 
Brown, 1984), the behaviors of the participants may have differed from those observed 
in real casinos. Anecdotal evidence suggests that our participants were indeed 
emotionally involved in the computer-based lottery game, as they tended to express 
great pleasure upon winning and great dissatisfaction upon losing. More importantly, 
higher levels of emotional involvement should be unlikely to favor rational thinking and 
if anything should lead to an increase in the illusion of control. As such, we would 
expect those results are likely to hold outside the laboratory. 
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The fact that only one type of game (French roulette) was used could be seen as 
another limitation of this research. Indeed, the numerous types of possible bets at each 
round may have given participants the impression that their probability of winning 
could be increased through the use of strategies. The mere act of choosing a lottery 
ticket has been shown to inflate perceptions of winning odds (Langer, 1975; Wohl & 
Enzlze, 2002). In addition, Gilovich and Douglas (1986) found that subjects who 
personally made a series of choices exhibited a bias in their outcome evaluations. 
However, Wohl and Enzle (2002) found that the mediating variable for such biases is 
not the belief in one’s ability to select the “winning ticket”, but rather the belief that 
luck is a personal quality that can be used intentionally. In our study, however, 
participants selecting bets in the “fortuitous win” condition (Experiment 2) did not show 
any increase in illusion of control. This result demonstrates that the key determinant in 
generating an increase in illusion of control is the belief that the previous winner 
controlled the gamble rather the mere opportunity to choose among different bets. 
Finally, an interesting direction for future research would be to investigate 
individual characteristics, which may affect players’ sensitivity to the report of other’s 
wins. Abrams and Kushner (2004), for example, emphasized the importance of 
dispositional traits (e.g., impulsiveness, sensation seeking and extraversion) in the 
development of pathological gambling. Similarly, individuals with varying scores on 
the PGS index (Problem Gambling Severity index, Ferris & Wynne, 2001) may be more 
or less sensitive to the report of others’ wins. 
Conclusions 
Our results illustrated the importance of studying social factors in understanding 
gambling behaviors. We were able to demonstrate that the knowledge of the amount 
won by another gambler increased the new player’s illusion of control over the outcome 
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of the gamble, which in turn increased the risks this player was willing to take, unless 
the reported win was qualified as fortuitous. The present findings have potentially 
important implications for the study of risky decision making in general. For example, a 
well-known consequence of Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992) is that individuals tend to be risk averse in the domain of wins: they 
would rather choose to win $3, 000 for sure than take part in a gamble for an 80% 
chance of winning $4, 000. Our findings suggest, however, that this classic pattern of 
choice could be inverted simply by letting the decision-maker know that another person 
who chose to gamble has won $4, 000. Finally, those results also have important 
implications for the prevention of excessive gambling behaviors: they suggest that an 
efficient measure to inhibit the effect of others’ wins on one’s own gambling in games 
of pure chance such as the French roulette could be to remind players that those wins 
are fortuitous. 
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Appendix 1: The rules of French roulette 
“French roulette is a game of pure chance based on the random selection of a 
number between 0 and 36 inclusive. The roulette wheel is divided into 37 evenly 
spaced slots numbered 0, and 1 through 36. The zero slot is green and the other 
numbers are either red or black. These numbers are reproduced in a grid on the 
layout table (displayed on the computer screen). Several other boxes are 
represented outside this grid of numbers. Before the wheel is spun, players make 
bets against the House by placing chips in various boxes or on the lines between 
the boxes on the layout table. A small ivory ball is then released into the outer 
edge of the spinning wheel, circling many times before slowing down. As the 
ball loses momentum it falls and drops into one of the slots to end that round of 
the game. There are three main categories of bets, distinguished by their winning 
odds and payouts. All combinations of these bets are possible in the same 
attempt; you can win or lose in each different bet you place.” 
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RT represents the amount of risk taken; NC, the number of chips placed on any given 
bet; PL, the probability of losing of this bet; and CT, the resources of the gambler at the 
time of placing the bet(s). The value of this measure varies in theory on a scale from 0 
to 1. In practice, it can neither be equal to 0 (since NC> 0 and PL> 0), nor 1 (since PL < 
1). 
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Table 1 
Chances of Winning and Payout for Each Type of Bet Allowed in the French Roulette 
Game 
Type of bet Chances of winning Payout 
 Simple bets (7)   
  Black  18 / 37   1 : 1 
  Red   18 / 37   1 : 1 
  Odd  18 / 37   1 : 1 
  Even  18 / 37   1 : 1 
  1 to 18  18 / 37   1 : 1 
  19 to 36  18 / 37   1 : 1 
 Double bets   
  Columns (5)  12 / 37  2 : 1 
  Dozens (6)  12 / 37  2 : 1 
 Multiple bets   
  One-number bet(1)  1 / 37 35 : 1 
  Two-number bet(2)  2 / 37 17 : 1 
  Three-number bet(3)  3 / 37 11 : 1 
  Four-number bet(4)  4 / 37  8 : 1 
Note. The numbers in brackets refer to the key to Figure 1. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1: Proposed overall model of causal relationships between the knowledge of 
another’s win and risk taking. 
Figure 2: The placement of different types of bets on the layout table 
Figure 3: Causal model between the knowledge of another person’s win, betting times 
and risk-taking behavior in Experiment 1. (The values in brackets are the standardized 
regression coefficients β; those without brackets are the same coefficient when the third 
variable is statistically controlled)  
Figure 4: Causal model between the knowledge of another person’s win, betting times 
and risk-taking behavior in Experiment 2. (The values in brackets are the standardized 
regression coefficients β; those without brackets are the same coefficient when the third 
variable is statistically controlled)  
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